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GRIGGS AT MIDLIFE
Deborah A. Widiss*
The Crusade for Equality in the Workplace: The Griggs v.
Duke Power Story. By Robert Belton. Edited by Stephen L. Wasby.
Topeka: University of Kansas Press. 2014. Pp. xi, 424. $39.95.
“‘Midlife transition’ is a natural stage that happens to many of us at some
point (usually at about age 40, give or take 20 years). . . . [It] can include
. . . [q]uestioning decisions made years earlier and the meaning of life
[and] [c]onfusion about who you are or where your life is going.”1
— Psychology Today

Introduction
Not all Supreme Court cases have a midlife crisis. But it is fair to say
that Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2 which recently turned forty, has some serious
symptoms. Griggs established a foundational proposition of employment
discrimination law known as disparate impact liability: policies that significantly disadvantage racial minority or female employees can violate federal
employment discrimination law, even if there is no evidence that the employer “intended” to discriminate.3 Griggs is frequently described as one of
the most important decisions of the civil rights era, compared to Brown v.
Board of Education for its “momentous social consequences.”4 In 1989, a
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. My thanks to
KT Albiston, Rachel Arnow-Richman, Joseph Fishkin, Tristin Green, Serena Mayeri, Camille
Gear Rich, and Leticia Saucedo, as well as to participants at the 2014 Annual Labor and
Employment Law Scholarship Colloquium and the “Past and Future of Disparate Impact”
panel discussion held at Vanderbilt Law School, for their helpful suggestions in response to
earlier drafts. I also thank the editors of the Michigan Law Review for their extremely
conscientious work.
1. Mid-Life, Psychol. Today, http://www.psychologytoday.com/conditions/mid-life
(last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
2. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (“The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”).
4. Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments,
63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1987); see also H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), at 23 (1991) (characterizing Griggs as “[t]he single most important Title VII decision, both for the development of
the law and in its impact on the daily lives of American workers”); Robert Belton, The
Crusade for Equality in the Workplace: The Griggs v. Duke Power Story 5 (2014)
(noting a television interview with Chief Justice Burger in which he identified Griggs as the
most important case handed down in his first two terms on the Court).
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Supreme Court decision threatened to gut the doctrine by significantly decreasing the burden on employers to justify policies with such disparate effects.5 Two years later, Congress repudiated that decision, embracing
disparate impact as a key aspect of discrimination law and codifying the
more rigorous standard initially enunciated in Griggs.6 The bill passed with
landslide majorities.7
At the time, this seemed a significant victory that would put to rest
claims that disparate impact liability was illegitimate. But in recent years,
there has been growing doctrinal and theoretical criticism of disparate impact. In 2009, Justice Scalia warned of a coming “war” between disparate
impact and equal protection, suggesting that the doctrine might be unconstitutional because it requires employers to assess whether a policy has racially disparate effects.8 The current Court has not been shy about
reconsidering bulwarks of the civil rights revolution,9 and Title VII’s disparate impact provisions may likewise be in jeopardy. (Indeed, as this Review
was being finalized for publication, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
a case regarding whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the
Fair Housing Act.10) Aside from this brewing constitutional question, disparate impact has recently been criticized by leading commentators as being
unreasonably disadvantageous to both employer and employee interests. For
example, Professor Wax argues that disparate impact unfairly exposes businesses to liability for adopting measures that predict job performance but
also cause a racially disparate impact.11 And Professor Selmi suggests that,
5. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (“[T]he dispositive issue
is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals
of the employer. . . . [T]here is no requirement that the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or
‘indispensable’ to the employer’s business.”).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991) (“The
purposes of this Act are . . . to codify the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) . . . [and]
to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits . . . .”); id. § 105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012)) (setting forth the
burden of proof in disparate impact cases).
7. The Act passed 93 to 5 in the Senate and 381 to 38 in the House. Pub. L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. 1071.
8. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
9. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (holding unconstitutional
section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, which set forth the coverage formula for preclearance
requirements); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)
(holding unconstitutional use of race as a factor to increase diversity in K–12 schools); see also
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (emphasizing that racially based
affirmative action in the education context must be subject to a searching examination).
10. See The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs,
747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted in part, 82 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (No.
13-1371). This case may well be decided on statutory interpretation grounds rather than constitutional grounds, but the Court’s reasoning might be significant in any subsequent challenge to disparate impact under Title VII.
11. Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 621 (2011) (arguing
that, because job-predictive tests consistently cause racially disparate effects, disparate impact
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although plaintiffs used the doctrine in some important victories, it may
have hindered other efforts to address discrimination by curtailing conceptions of discriminatory intent.12 Moreover, as a practical matter, disparate
impact plays a relatively small role in modern employment discrimination
litigation, in part because a different portion of the 1991 Act enhanced the
remedies available for plaintiffs who prove intentional discrimination.13
Thus, even if the Court reaffirms its constitutionality, disparate impact risks
receding into obsolescence. Like other forty-year-olds, Griggs must come to
terms with its place in modern society.
It is thus fortunate that, at this critical juncture, Robert Belton’s The
Crusade for Equality in the Workplace: The Griggs v. Duke Power Story14 has
been published. The book is the first comprehensive history of the litigation
campaign that led to this seminal decision. Belton, a former law professor
and a nationally recognized expert in employment discrimination law, began
his legal career as an attorney at the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund (“LDF”). He was hired shortly after Title VII was enacted, and he was
charged with figuring out how best to litigate under the new statute. Griggs
was one of his first cases.
Belton’s primary objective in the book is to offer a window into disparate impact’s birth and early life. In this respect, the book unquestionably
succeeds. Belton provides an insightful account of how lawyers, judges, academics, and activists sought to realize Title VII’s transformative potential;
The Crusade for Equality is an important addition to the growing body of
work on Griggs’s origins.15 Although Belton acknowledges debate over disparate impact, he offers little direct response to recent critical or doctrinal
should be modified or eliminated); cf. Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 2157, 2159 (characterizing research as establishing a “consensus in the scholarly
literature that as a statistical matter, a cognitive ability test is likely to have something approaching one standard deviation of disparate racial impact on Blacks” but arguing that this
finding emphasizes the need for retaining disparate impact liability).
12. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 701
(2006); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 20–24 (2006) (arguing that disparate impact has been ineffective at
challenging subjective employment practices or other structural aspects of employment besides testing).
13. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 12, at 738–42 (finding that relatively few “pure” disparate
impact claims succeed); Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42 Brandeis L.J. 597 (2004) (reviewing cases
in which disparate impact could have been pleaded but was not). As discussed infra Part III,
the doctrine has regained some prominence as a vehicle for challenging criminal background
screens.
14. Robert Belton was Professor of Law Emeritus, Vanderbilt Law School.
15. Other significant accounts include the following: Robert Smith, Race, Labor, &
Civil Rights: Griggs Versus Duke Power and the Struggle for Equal Employment
Opportunity (2008) (emphasizing the role that Willie Boyd, one of the plaintiffs in Griggs,
and other grassroots labor and civil rights activists played in early implementation of Title
VII); Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 Fla.
L. Rev. 251 (2011) (emphasizing the extent to which state and federal agencies addressing
employment discrimination even prior to Title VII’s enactment utilized disparate impact
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challenges. This Review addresses that crucial gap. My focus is not the looming question of disparate impact’s constitutionality—an issue that has been
well plumbed in the years since Justice Scalia’s shot across the bow16—but
rather the deeper question of how much will, or could, the result in that
coming war matter? In other words, how useful is disparate impact?
Part I of this Review fleshes out the history of Griggs, giving readers a
sense of the rich detail found in the book. Belton introduces modern readers
to the key players in the unfolding drama and helps us better understand the
strategic choices that shaped the now-familiar doctrine. The book establishes
that Griggs and its progeny played a central role in dismantling facially neutral tests and educational requirements—many of which were implemented
by Southern employers who had previously relied on explicit racial classifications to relegate blacks to the least desirable jobs—that could have severely
limited the efficacy of Title VII from its inception.
Part II of the Review also explores disparate impact’s early years, but it
focuses on the development of the doctrine in sex discrimination cases,
which are almost entirely absent from Belton’s narrative. By supplying this
missing piece of the story, Part II provides a more nuanced discussion of
disparate impact’s history and a more muted assessment of its achievements.
This Part shows that courts have generally rejected efforts to use the doctrine
to require changes to workplace policies that are insufficiently supportive of
pregnancy or family caregiving responsibilities. Advocates have long recognized that women of color were—and remain—disproportionately harmed
by such policies. This Part suggests that the failure to develop an intersectional understanding of disparate impact doctrine thus risks ignoring key
vectors of exclusion.
Part III then turns to the present, looking at current efforts to use the
doctrine to challenge employers’ use of criminal background screens in hiring. This campaign is still evolving, and it illustrates some of the pitfalls, but
also the promise, that the early history of the doctrine suggested. Part III
also further develops the discussion of intersectional disparate impact analysis. Arrest and conviction rates are heavily skewed by both race and sex;
assessing the disparate impact of a background screening policy on the basis
of either factor alone dilutes the disparate impact that such policies impose
on black and Latino men. Finally, this Part discusses the central role that
frameworks); Samuel Estreicher, The Story of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., in Employment Discrimination Stories (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006) (tracing history and emphasizing a shift
in statutory interpretation methods); David J. Garrow, Toward a Definitive History of Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 67 Vand. L. Rev. 197 (2014) (book review) (providing a positive review of
Belton’s book that summarizes key aspects of the history he covers); and Selmi, supra note 12,
at 708–24 (tracing history similar to that covered by Belton but emphasizing the extent to
which these early cases dealt with specific instances of past discrimination).
16. See generally, e.g., Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a
Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 197 (2010) (discussing disparate
impact’s constitutionality under contemporary equal protection jurisprudence); Richard
Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1341 (2010) (same); Rosenthal,
supra note 11 (same).

April 2015]

Griggs at Midlife

997

compliance work plays in modern efforts to ensure equal employment
opportunity.
My title—and my focus—is optimistic. I hope and believe that disparate
impact will remain viable and that Griggs’s early life offers lessons to capitalize further on the doctrine today. Of course, it is possible that Griggs may
not be at midlife; it may be on its deathbed. If this turns out to be the case,
Robert Belton’s book nonetheless deserves attention: it will serve as an eloquent eulogy for a foundational case that expanded employment opportunity in this country and that continues to be a model around the world.
I. Disparate Impact’s Early Years: Race Discrimination
Belton characterizes the story as an “insider’s, first-person, behind-thescenes history of the litigation campaign that led to Griggs and much of its
progeny” (p. 6). We are lucky to have it. Belton brings readers into the heady
days of first litigating under Title VII, a time when leading public interest
organizations, private lawyers, government agencies, academics, and judges
were all grappling with what “discrimination” would mean under the new
law. Belton has a rich trove of sources for his story, including LDF case files
and documents that are not yet open to the public; interviews with key participants; papers of some of the judges and Supreme Court justices who
participated in the major cases in the story; and, of course, his own memories (pp. 10–11). The manuscript was largely completed prior to Belton’s
death in 2012. It was finalized for publication by Stephen Wasby, a respected
political scientist with an expertise in the civil rights movement and the
federal courts (pp. x–xi). The book is well indexed; readers interested in
particular civil rights advocates or particular cases during these pivotal years
will easily be able to identify their role in the story.
Belton provides context for and texture to the factual allegations recited
in the Supreme Court decision in Griggs. Students and scholars of employment discrimination law know that, prior to the enactment of Title VII,
Duke Power relegated black workers to the least desirable class of jobs in the
Dan River power plant (pp. 108–09). The company then used facially neutral rules to freeze these racially discriminatory policies in place; only employees who had graduated from high school or who could pass a
standardized intelligence test were permitted to transfer to jobs inside the
plant.17 Belton reminds us that the test requirement was implemented on the
day Title VII became effective. We also learn that, notwithstanding the new
law, the plant maintained racially segregated locker rooms, showers, drinking fountains, and toilets (p. 109). White employees had facilities inside the
power plant’s main building; the black employees’ facilities were in a separate “crowded, filthy” building at the base of the coal stockpile (p. 109).

17. Belton includes some sample questions from the test—for example, “Does B.C. mean
‘before Christ’?”—that vividly illustrate their irrelevance to work at the plant. P. 353 n.45.
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In March 1966, all fourteen of the African Americans employed at the
plant filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) (p. 116). Thirteen of them joined the court case that followed (p. 123).18 Belton rightly celebrates the courage these “unsung heroes”
displayed in their willingness to challenge their employer, particularly since
several of them had worked at the facility since it opened in 1949 (pp. 9,
108). The employees collectively decided that Willie Griggs should be named
the lead plaintiff because he was the youngest and thus had “the least to
lose” if Duke Power retaliated (pp. 123–24). But this is not to say that he had
nothing to lose. Griggs, age 32, was married and a father of four.
Belton offers compelling vignettes of the large team of LDF attorneys
and collaborating attorneys, testing experts, and federal judges who played
key roles in the unfolding story. Many of these vignettes, including Belton’s
own experiences growing up in the Jim Crow South (pp. 39–40), provide
vivid reminders of the pervasive racism that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
enacted to address. Although (as discussed infra Part II) the narrative does
not address the development of disparate impact doctrine in sex discrimination cases, Belton highlights several pioneering women who were lawyers or
experts in Griggs and other early race discrimination cases.19
The snapshots of lawyers and litigants include many arresting details,
but the narrative thrust of the book is not the story of the participants—it is
the story of the litigation campaign itself. Belton contrasts LDF’s efforts to
implement Title VII with its earlier (although then still ongoing) litigation
campaign against educational segregation. In the years leading up to and
then implementing Brown v. Board of Education,20 LDF painstakingly
orchestrated the order in which issues were presented to the courts. But Title
VII created a statutory right and a federal agency charged with investigating
complaints and providing guidance under the new law. The U.S. Department of Justice and later the EEOC had their own litigation priorities. So did
the thousands of employees across the country who filed complaints of discrimination. There was no way LDF could control the campaign with the
same discipline it had displayed in the school desegregation context. Instead,
as Belton explains, the organization simply tried to act nimbly to present
issues in the order and manner it believed would be most effective.
Belton was an expert in Title VII’s procedural and remedial provisions,
and the book highlights how early victories on these nonsubstantive fronts
dramatically increased the law’s potential for effectuating real change. Contemporary readers may be interested in—and disheartened by—the extent
18. The one black employee who did not join the lawsuit had been promoted to a previously all-white job category during the period that the EEOC was investigating the plant. P.
123.
19. See, e.g., pp. 41–42 (discussing Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, who was part of the “core
of the LDF’s employment discrimination litigation team” in its early years); pp. 103–04 (discussing Phyllis A. Wallace, who served as chief of technical studies for the EEOC when it
developed its first guidelines on testing procedures).
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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to which these early procedural questions continue to reverberate. For example, Belton discusses how employers sought to challenge the adequacy of the
EEOC conciliation efforts as a defense to later actions (p. 59); although it
remains settled that private parties can proceed to litigation without assessing prior conciliation efforts, this kind of claim has recently been resurrected, and it has gained significant traction as a defense to actions brought
by the EEOC itself.21 Similarly, Belton recounts LDF’s efforts to establish
that employment discrimination claims may be litigated as class actions (pp.
60–68); this is another doctrine that is once again under pressure.22 But the
plaintiff perspective on one key procedural issue has flipped. Belton explains
that, in the early years, he and other LDF attorneys felt that it was absolutely
crucial that Title VII claims be tried before judges rather than juries; they
assumed, probably correctly, that Southern juries would be hostile to employment discrimination claims (pp. 68–72). Accordingly, they did not even
ask for back pay in early cases (including Griggs), and they later assiduously
sought to characterize such awards as equitable (pp. 68–72). Today, by contrast, plaintiffs’ attorneys generally perceive juries as relatively sympathetic
to employees in employment discrimination cases, and one of the reforms
that civil rights groups sought in the 1991 Act was the right to a jury trial
and the economic damages that go with it.23
Belton brings readers inside the LDF team’s trial preparation for Griggs.
None of the plaintiffs testified, but each side presented an expert to assess
the extent to which the tests and the high-school degree requirement measured job-relevant skills. Additionally, Duke Power’s vice president of Production and Operations testified; on cross-examination, he made the key
admission that employees without a high-school diploma were able to perform the inside jobs and that he “[did not] think there is anything magic
about a High School education” (p. 131).
There was little statistical evidence proffered. Belton explains that
“[s]trong evidence as to the adverse impact of the test battery on [blacks] . . .
was simply not available because only three employees—one white and two
blacks—had opted to take the tests, and none had passed” (p. 129). Ultimately, the Supreme Court inferred the disparate impact by taking judicial
notice of statewide graduation rates and prior EEOC decisions regarding
racial disparities on the intelligence tests.24 Interestingly, the high-school
data compared the graduation rates of black males to those of white males;
this fact was not mentioned as significant in any respect. As discussed infra
Parts II and III, an intersectional approach to disparate impact has never
been developed, although current cases concerning criminal record checks
21. See EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 182–84 (7th Cir. 2013) (detailing a
circuit split regarding whether such claims are cognizable), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872
(2014).
22. See, e.g., Walmart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
23. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–74
(1991).
24. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971).
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may call for such an approach. More generally, the Court’s ready use of
statewide data rather than employment-specific data stands in sharp contrast to the requirements placed on plaintiffs in modern disparate impact
litigation.
Belton discusses in detail the decisions in the lower courts—a loss in the
district court25 and a partial victory at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.26 Leading up to the decision in the Fourth Circuit, opinion
drafts were circulated among all of the circuit’s judges, not merely among
members of the panel. Belton quotes extensively from memoranda documenting an internal debate as to the appropriate framework for assessing the
claims; he states that a majority of the full circuit supported the position
that Judge Sobeloff adopted in his partial dissent, which foreshadowed the
Supreme Court’s favorable treatment of disparate impact (pp. 151–57). We
also learn that the LDF lawyers were divided on whether to petition for
certiorari and that their key academic adviser, as well as their allies in the
Justice Department and the EEOC, opposed seeking review (pp. 162–65).
Nonetheless, LDF took its chances and won a significant victory. Belton discusses LDF’s briefing strategy in the Supreme Court; important amicus
briefs; pivotal moments in the oral argument; the justices’ positions at conference, as gleaned from the notes of Justices Douglas and Blackmun; and
revisions that were made to Chief Justice Burger’s first draft of the opinion
(pp. 162–87).
While the book is illuminating in its detail, some readers might crave a
little more critical assessment of these strategic choices, most centrally the
decision to position intentional discrimination only as a “fallback” argument
(p. 170). Certainly, there is reason to believe that the company adopted the
intelligence tests knowing full well the racial impact they would have. The
suspicious timing, and the fact that the company maintained segregated
locker rooms and restrooms even after Title VII went into effect, could have
bolstered a case for intentional discrimination. Although the Supreme Court
ultimately accepted the lower courts’ determination that Duke Power had
not “intentionally” discriminated,27 Selmi and others argue that the Court
might have concluded differently if the plaintiffs had framed the company’s
conduct as intentionally exclusionary.28 Belton’s discussion of the briefing
strategy, however, does not substantively engage with this critique (p. 170).
He merely mentions earlier in the narrative that the members of the litigation team found it “ironic” that the tests were put into place on the day Title
VII went into effect (p. 111).
The latter half of the book shows how LDF capitalized on its win in
Griggs. Belton provides an extensive discussion of Albemarle Paper Co. v.

25. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
26. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
27. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428, 432.
28. See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 12, at 757–58.
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Moody29 and Franks v. Bowman Transportation, Inc.,30 which further developed the standard that would be used to assess employers’ justifications for
practices that cause a disparate impact and established Title VII’s “make
whole” approach to remedies (ch. 11). Belton provides less detail regarding
the doctrine’s development after the 1970s, but he ably summarizes how
Griggs interacted with the affirmative action debates of the 1980s (ch. 12)
and describes the watering down of the disparate impact doctrine in Watson31 and Wards Cove32 (ch. 13). Belton then discusses the “resurrection” of
disparate impact as part of the 1991 Civil Rights Act (ch. 14). Pulling language from Griggs and Moody, the law requires employers to demonstrate
that any specific employment practice that causes a disparate impact is job
related and a business necessity, and the law further states that plaintiffs may
prevail by identifying a less discriminatory alternative.33 Although Congress
failed to delineate precisely what these terms mean, the 1991 Act clearly
endorses disparate impact doctrine as an important mechanism for addressing employment discrimination, and Belton rightly celebrates it.
An epilogue maps out Griggs’s ongoing significance at the micro level—
what happened to the employees who brought the suit—and at the macro
level—the key role that Griggs has played in theoretical understandings of
discrimination under other federal statutes, state employment discrimination statutes, and the development of employment discrimination doctrine
around the world.34 These effects continue to be significant. After the book
went to press, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
issued new regulations endorsing the doctrine as applicable under the Fair
Housing Act (as noted above, as this Review was being finalized for publication, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a case challenging the regulations).35 Nonetheless, in the employment discrimination context, disparate
impact has enjoyed relatively few courtroom successes since 1991—and, as
the next Part makes clear, its impact even prior to 1991 was somewhat more
muted than Belton’s story suggests.
II. Disparate Impact’s Early Years: Sex Discrimination
There were, unsurprisingly, no women among the plaintiffs in Griggs (p.
107); Belton does not address the extent to which this fact suggests that sex
29. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
30. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
31. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
32. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071, 1074–75 (1991).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2012).
34. For a recent assessment of Griggs’s influence on the development of European antidiscrimination law, see Julie C. Suk, Disparate Impact Abroad, in A Nation of Widening
Opportunities? The Civil Rights Act at Fifty (Samuel R. Bagenstos & Ellen D. Katz eds.,
forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2408143.
35. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2014); see also supra note 10.
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discrimination—as well as race discrimination—was at work. More generally, the book’s conclusions are somewhat distorted by its exclusive focus on
race discrimination cases. Broadening the lens to consider the contemporaneous development of the doctrine in sex discrimination cases offers a more
nuanced assessment of disparate impact’s achievements, even in the early
years on which Belton focuses.36
Sex discrimination cases pose some questions that are distinct from
those implicated in race discrimination cases. In part, this is because Title
VII categorically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, but it provides a statutory defense for discrimination on the basis of sex if an employer can prove that sex was a “bona fide occupational qualification”
(“BFOQ”) for the position in question.37 Additionally, the EEOC and the
courts had to grapple with the extent to which Title VII required employers
to respond to, or permitted employers to consider, the physical differences
between men and women and the gendered expectations of family roles.38
These questions intersected with disparate impact doctrine in ways that Belton fails to consider but that help explain the doctrine’s ultimate reach.
The very first Title VII case that the Supreme Court decided—the term
before it decided Griggs—foreshadowed the complicated interplay between
these issues, although the short per curiam opinion that the Court issued in
the case, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,39 obscures this interplay. Ida Phillips applied for a job as an assembly trainee but was denied the position
because Martin Marietta refused to hire women with preschool-age children.
Phillips contended that this refusal constituted sex discrimination since the
company hired men with preschool-age children; the company defended its
actions on the grounds that it did not generally discriminate against women,
only women with young children. The Supreme Court held that summary
judgment for the employer was inappropriate and remanded for further
36. My analysis focuses on the importance of considering sex as well as race (also sometimes litigated as discrimination on the basis of color) because the Supreme Court has analyzed the doctrine in those two contexts far more often than in other contexts. This is not
surprising since sex and race are, and have long been, by far the most common bases of Title
VII claims. Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125
Harv. L. Rev. 1307, 1335 (2012) (noting that one-third of the claims the EEOC received in its
first year were related to sex discrimination); Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, U.S.
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
charges.cfm (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (showing race and sex claims to be far more common
than other claims besides retaliation); Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996, U.S. Equal
Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm
(last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (same). That said, it is important to recognize that disparate impact doctrine, as well as the “bona fide occupational qualification” defense, also applies to
national-origin and religion claims. Disparate impact has played a significant role in challenging English-only policies. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993); 29
C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)–(b) (2013). It has been less utilized in the religion context because of a
separate statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
38. For a detailed account of Title VII’s early sex discrimination doctrine, see Franklin,
supra note 36.
39. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
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consideration.40 The Court did suggest, however, that the policy might be
justified as a BFOQ, which spurred Justice Marshall to issue a strongly
worded concurrence warning that the exception should not be allowed to
“swallow the rule” by permitting ongoing reliance on the (presumed)
“proper role for women” to justify discrimination.41
Phillips was not a disparate impact case. Rather, the case was the genesis
of the doctrine that came to be known as sex-plus. Indeed, since the company openly differentiated between employees with young children on the
basis of sex, the case appears to be the antithesis of a typical disparate impact
case. But if the company had simply framed its policy as a refusal to hire
primary caregivers of young children—that is, no longer making explicit the
stereotyped assumption that undergirded the company’s actual policy—it
would immediately become a disparate impact case, in which a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on the basis of sex. And, in this
respect, Justice Marshall’s concerns regarding the malleability of the BFOQ
were prescient, not only in the context of the BFOQ defense itself but also in
the related analysis employed in the “business-necessity” defense announced
the following year in Griggs. In general, sex-based disparate impact claims
have been a successful tool for challenging discrete employer requirements
such as height or weight restrictions, but courts have not required employers
to restructure workplace norms that fail to respond adequately to caregiving
responsibilities or to the physical aspects of pregnancy.
As I discuss elsewhere, immediately after Title VII was enacted, the
EEOC, courts, and advocates struggled to determine whether and how Title
VII’s prohibition on discrimination on the basis of “sex” applied to pregnancy.42 By 1972, however, the EEOC promulgated guidelines stating that
pregnancy discrimination would generally be considered a form of sex discrimination.43 The guidelines also incorporated disparate impact, providing
that terminating “temporarily disabled” employees pursuant to a policy that
affords insufficient or no employment leave for health conditions violates
the statute if the policy “has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and
is not justified by business necessity.”44 In the years immediately after the
guidelines were released, lower courts generally accepted the EEOC’s
reasoning.45

40. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
41. Id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
42. See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 961, 979–84
(2013).
43. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6837 (Apr. 5,
1972) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a)–(b)); see also Widiss, supra note 42, at 989–91 (discussing the EEOC’s guidance).
44. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 37 Fed. Reg. at 6837.
45. See Widiss, supra note 42, at 991 n.129 (collecting cases).
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In 1976, however, the Supreme Court disagreed. General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert46 was a challenge to a company’s disability policy that covered most
health conditions but excluded coverage for pregnancy. The Court first relied on a prior constitutional decision to hold that the pregnancy exclusion
did not automatically qualify as sex discrimination.47 Then it considered
whether the employees could succeed on a disparate impact claim. Professor
Mayeri documents that Justices Powell and Stewart initially considered
Griggs as persuasive or controlling.48 Ultimately, however, they both joined
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion rejecting the disparate impact claim
and holding that, because there was “no proof that the package is in fact
worth more to men than to women, it is impossible to find any genderbased discriminatory effect.”49 Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall)
dissented, arguing that the Court should defer to the EEOC’s reasonable
conclusion that the plan had discriminatory effects.50
Underneath the formalistic disagreement as to the sufficiency of the
proof, the justices were carrying on an argument sotto voce regarding the
viability of disparate impact under Title VII more generally. The timing is
significant here. Just six months earlier, the Court had held in Washington v.
Davis that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.51 Gilbert was the Court’s first opportunity to consider Washington v. Davis’s significance to Title VII analysis. Justice Rehnquist’s first
draft of the majority decision in Gilbert was read by some as effectively overruling Griggs; Justice Powell responded by suggesting several changes that
were adopted to shore up Griggs.52 To the extent that the majority opinion
remained unclear,53 Justices Stewart and Blackmun each filed brief concurrences that affirmed that Griggs remained good law,54 as did the dissents
filed by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.55
46. 429 U.S. 125, 127–28 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, as recognized in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85, 89 (1983).
47. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133–37 (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494, 496–97
(1974)).
48. See Serena Mayeri, Reasoning from Race: Feminism, Law, and the Civil
Rights Revolution 111 (2011).
49. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 155–56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
52. Mayeri, supra note 48, at 113–14.
53. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 137 (suggesting that a showing of intent might be required at
least to proceed under section 703(a)(1) of Title VII).
54. Id. at 146 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 153, 154–55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that prior decisions of the
Supreme Court and “every Court of Appeals now have firmly settled that a prima facie violation of Title VII . . . is established by demonstrating that a facially neutral classification has the
effect of discriminating against members of a defined class” and criticizing the majority opinion’s “unexplained and inexplicable implications to the contrary” (footnote omitted)); id. at
161 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Griggs favorably).
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The following year, the Court again grappled with a sex discrimination
case that could have diminished disparate impact’s viability generally. In
Dothard v. Rawlinson, Dianne Rawlinson challenged Alabama regulations
that set minimum height and weight requirements for prison guards; the
regulations also precluded women from guarding men in maximum-security
prisons and men from guarding women in the (lone) maximum-security
prison housing female inmates.56 Alabama sought to make the case a
broader referendum on the meaning of Griggs. In its brief, the state cited
Gilbert, and the evidence referenced in Griggs that Duke Power had overtly
discriminated on the basis of race, to suggest that the plaintiff would have to
show a disproportionate effect and a “past history of overt sexual discrimination.”57 The state also contended that Rawlinson’s reliance on national
statistics to demonstrate the height and weight regulations’ disparate impact
was insufficient because the statistical averages did not necessarily represent
actual “applicants.”58
Again, the Court rejected these broader attacks on disparate impact.
Without mentioning Gilbert, the Court reaffirmed that disparate effects
alone were sufficient to state a prima facie case of disparate impact.59 It then
baldly stated that there was “no requirement . . . that a statistical showing of
disproportionate impact must always be based on the characteristics of actual applicants,” noting, reasonably, that individuals who could not meet the
height or weight requirements might not bother to apply.60 The Court went
on to hold that, because Alabama had failed to show that the requirements
correlated with the strength required to do the job, these requirements could
not satisfy the job-related and business-necessity test.61 But three justices
filed a concurrence simply to highlight the grounds on which general population statistics could be challenged in the future and to emphasize that employers might be able to prove that height and weight requirements are an
adequate proxy for strength.62 Moreover, the majority held (over a passionate dissent by Justices Marshall and Brennan) that the sex-matching requirements could be justified under the BFOQ defense, on the ground that sex
offenders and other prisoners might be especially likely to assault female
guards.63
Gilbert and Dothard together preserved the possibility of disparate impact claims on the basis of sex and the formal framework as enunciated in
Griggs, but they circumscribed the extent to which the doctrine could be
used to make workplaces more welcoming to women. Although later courts
56.
57.
422).
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

433 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1977).
Brief of Appellants at 39–40, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 453 U.S. 321 (1977) (No. 76Id. at 41.
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 337–40 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Id. at 335–37 (majority opinion).
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have rejected claims that being male is a BFOQ for guarding men,64 they are
often quite deferential to strength or endurance tests that also tend to disadvantage women.65 Moreover, even though a 1977 Supreme Court case held
that a policy that stripped seniority from women on maternity leave was
illegal under a disparate impact theory,66 and even though Congress overrode Gilbert in 1978,67 courts have generally remained hostile to disparate
impact claims based on pregnancy.68 Similarly, despite a few exceptions, efforts to use the doctrine to challenge policies that disadvantage part-time
workers or that fail to accommodate caregiving responsibilities have generally foundered; courts typically conclude either that there is insufficient statistical evidence of a particular practice’s disparate impact or that workplace
time norms are justified as a business necessity.69 (In Europe, however,
where Griggs helped shape the emergence of what is known as indirect discrimination, claims concerning part-time workers have been far more successful.70) And, as discussed more fully below, the Court’s questioning in
these early sex cases regarding the appropriateness of relying on national or
regional statistics, as opposed to data from an employer’s own policies, has
since borne fruit.
The discussion so far has analyzed these cases simply as sex discrimination cases. But in fact, as Mayeri’s research makes clear, issues of race and
sex intersect throughout this doctrine, although they often do so under the
surface.71 For example, consider once more Phillips, the Supreme Court’s
very first Title VII case. Ida Phillips was white, but she was represented in
the case by LDF. Her Supreme Court brief emphasized the extent to which
the employer’s refusal to hire women with young children had a significant
“adverse impact” on black mothers because they were more likely to be
working than white mothers.72 “Black women,” the brief argued, “suffering
under the double discrimination of race and sex are the most oppressed
64. See, e.g., Suzanne Wilhelm, Perpetuating Stereotypical Views of Women: The Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification Defense in Gender Discrimination under Title VII, 28 Women’s Rts.
L. Rep. 73, 85–90 (2007) (gathering cases and noting that courts do accept arguments that
being female is a BFOQ for guarding women).
65. See, e.g., Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 308 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002).
66. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
67. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
68. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 Yale J.L. & Feminism 15,
41–49 (2009) (gathering and critiquing cases); Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out
Low-Income Workers, 28 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 32–35 (2007) (similar).
69. See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 1093,
1144–52 (gathering and critiquing cases); O’Leary, supra note 68, at 35–38 (similar).
70. See Suk, supra note 34 (manuscript at 8–12).
71. See generally Mayeri, supra note 48.
72. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (No.
73).
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group of workers in the society.”73 The Supreme Court’s decision, however,
did not explore whether there could be racial dimensions to the policy, and
subsequent decisions have evinced a similar discomfort with considering
what became known as intersectional claims.74
If both sex and race claims are raised in a disparate impact case but they
address policies that are wholly separate and distinct, the analysis is straightforward. For example, in an early class action initiated by Elizabeth Smith,
an African American woman, against the East Cleveland police department,
the court held that the department’s height and weight requirements unlawfully discriminated on the basis of sex, and the court separately concluded
that the department’s written entrance exam unlawfully discriminated on
the basis of race.75 When the claims are more integrated, however, it is less
clear how the disparate impact analysis should proceed. The leading case
typically cited as rejecting intersectional analysis was a disparate impact case
(also litigated by LDF in the mid-1970s) that challenged a seniority system,
alleging that black women were uniquely disadvantaged by the employer’s
use of hiring practices, prior to the effective date of Title VII, that discriminated on the basis of both race and sex.76 Although the claims of race and
sex discrimination were joined, the court insisted on analyzing the sex claim
as totally distinct from the race claim rather than creating a “new ‘super
remedy.’”77 While later cases have occasionally recognized the possibility of
bringing intersectional disparate treatment claims,78 intersectional disparate
impact doctrine has been very little developed.79

73. Id.; see also Mayeri, supra note 48, at 51–56 (discussing this case).
74. Professor Crenshaw is generally credited with articulating the theoretical frame we
now call intersectionality. See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139.
75. Smith v. City of E. Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1144, 1149 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975); Mayeri, supra
note 48, at 106 (discussing this case). Because the facts in the case predated Title VII’s applicability to municipal employers, the plaintiffs brought claims under the Equal Protection Clause
and § 1983.
76. DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., St. Louis, 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo.
1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 1977).
77. Id. at 143.
78. The leading case is Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025,
1032–33 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994);
Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987). See generally Rachel Kahn
Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 Law & Soc’y Rev. 991 (2011).
79. An intersectional disparate impact claim was brought in Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987), a challenge to a club with a “role-model” rule that
required firing employees who became pregnant while unmarried. The court accepted the
intersectional claim without any substantive analysis but then found that the rule was justified
as a business necessity.
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This is unfortunate. As Phillips suggested, failure by employers to accommodate pregnancy and caregiving responsibilities disproportionately affects women of color. Black and Latino women are more likely to work in
service or other low-wage jobs that are often particularly hostile to providing
accommodations for pregnancy or giving time off for maternity leave or
family obligations.80 They are more likely than white women to be raising
children as single mothers, and thus they are more likely to need flexibility
to accommodate unexpected caregiving needs.81 And black and Latino
women are less likely than white women to be covered under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, because they are disproportionately unlikely to meet the
statute’s prerequisites of having worked for a current employer for at least a
year and for at least 1,250 hours.82
It seems doubtful that courts will suddenly change course and begin
holding that disparate impact analysis requires employers to modify workplace structures to accommodate pregnancy and caregiving responsibilities.
Rather than pushing disparate impact theory, advocates have advanced arguments under the amended Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),83 the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”),84 and Title VII disparate treatment

80. See generally Stephanie Bornstein, Ctr. for WorkLife Law, Poor, Pregnant,
and Fired: Caregiver Discrimination Against Low-Wage Workers (2011), available at
http://worklifelaw.org/pubs/PoorPregnantAndFired.pdf; Rebecca Thiess, Econ. Policy Inst.,
Briefing Paper No. 341, The Future of Work: Trends and Challenges for Low-Wage
Workers 4 (2012), available at http://s2.epi.org/files/2012/bp341-future-of-work.pdf (indicating that low-wage workers are disproportionately female and disproportionately minority).
81. Children in Single-Parent Families by Race, Kids Count Data Ctr., http://datacenter
.kidscount.org/data/tables/107-children-in-single-parent-families-by#detailed/1/any/false/868,
867,133,38,35/10,168,9,12,1,13,185/432,431 (last updated Feb. 2014).
82. See, e.g., O’Leary, supra note 68, at 41–45.
83. See, e.g., U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance No.
915.003, Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (2014), available at http://www
.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm (discussing when the ADA would require
workplace accommodations for pregnancy); Joan C. Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodations After the ADA Amendments Act, 32 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 97 (2013)
(discussing claims for pregnancy accommodations under the amended ADA).
84. See, e.g., U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, supra note 83 (interpreting the
PDA as often requiring workplace accommodations for pregnancy); Widiss, supra note 42
(arguing that the PDA generally requires that pregnant employees receive the same level of
accommodations that employees with disabilities or workplace injuries receive). As this Review
was being finalized for publication, the Supreme Court was considering a case regarding the
extent to which the PDA requires workplace accommodations. See Young v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2898 (2014). An amicus brief
filed in the case highlights the particular salience of the issue for black women. See Brief of
Amicus Curiae Black Women’s Health Imperative, Joined by Other Black Women’s Health
Organizations, in Support of Petitioner, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2898
(2014) (No. 12-1226).
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stereotyping claims,85 as well as lobbied for new legislation,86 that support
pregnant women and working parents. There have been promising developments on all of these fronts in recent years. One can wonder, however,
whether the disparate impact doctrine would have developed more favorably
if courts had considered the racial as well as the gendered aspect of the
discrimination at issue. As discussed below, the failure to develop a robust
understanding of intersectional disparate impact analysis may also have
ramifications for the current challenges against criminal background
screens, which tend to disproportionately exclude black and Latino men.
III. Disparate Impact Today: Criminal Background Screening
In an influential article published in 2006, Professor Selmi asked
whether disparate impact had been a mistake.87 He reviewed the basic contours of the history that Belton discusses, as well as the early sex discrimination cases, and concluded that disparate impact has enjoyed little success
outside the testing context in which it was born.88 Selmi suggested that
courts were reluctant to require businesses to modify workplace practices
more generally because disparate impact was divorced from “blameworthy”
discrimination.89 And finally, he argued that, without disparate impact, litigants and courts might have developed a more robust understanding of “intentional” discrimination, one that could have been a successful vehicle for
challenging subtle or systemic discrimination.90 Selmi’s critique is important, and it deserves—and has received—considerable debate and
discussion.
But mistake or not, disparate impact did happen. And although the doctrine was rather moribund when Selmi published his article, it has recently
regained some prominence, most notably as a mechanism for challenging
the widespread and relatively indiscriminate use of criminal background
checks in employment. Moreover, it is unlikely that even a more capacious
understanding of intentional discrimination would reach employers’ use of
85. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009) (reversing summary
judgment granted to employer who had denied a promotion to a mother of triplets based on
the assumption that she would prioritize caregiving responsibilities over her paid job).
86. See, e.g., Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, Nat’l Partnership for Women & Families,
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/issues/fairness/pregnant-workers-fairness-act.html (last
visited Sept. 25, 2014) (collecting resources regarding state and proposed federal legislation
mandating employer accommodations for pregnancy); Paid Leave, Nat’l Partnership for
Women & Families, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/issues/work-family/paid-leave.html
(last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (collecting resources regarding state and proposed federal legislation providing paid family and medical leave); Support Paid Sick Days, http://paidsickdays
.org (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (collecting resources regarding state and proposed federal
legislation on paid sick days, including paid days to take care of family members who are sick).
87. Selmi, supra note 12.
88. Id. at 734–53.
89. Id. at 773–75.
90. Id. at 776–82.
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criminal background checks, particularly for employers who maintain relatively high levels of minority employment.91 Cases regarding criminal background screens thus isolate the essence of disparate impact as a vehicle to
challenge a facially neutral policy that is implemented without any “intent”
to discriminate but that disproportionately excludes black or Latino applicants. My objective here is not to offer a comprehensive discussion of the
many complicated questions raised by the use of background checks (for
example, there is some evidence that they actually increase absolute levels of
minority employment by letting employers “disprove” stereotyped assumptions that all black males are likely ex-offenders92), nor do I provide a full
assessment of the EEOC’s response to this practice.93 I also do not take a
position on Selmi’s underlying question of whether disparate impact was a
mistake. I simply hope to show how the strengths and limitations that are
revealed by disparate impact’s early history continue to reverberate and to
suggest some potential avenues for building on the doctrine’s early success.
The backdrop for this story is the dramatic expansion of the criminaljustice system over the past several decades. An estimated sixty-five million
U.S. adults, more than 25% of the adult population, have at least an arrest
on their record.94 (Although many individuals who are arrested are never
convicted of a crime, arrests generally show up on criminal background
checks.95) There is a significant racial and gender skew in arrests; for example, African Americans account for about 28% of all arrests, even though
they make up only 14% of the U.S. population,96 and nearly 74% of all

91. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978) (recognizing that the
racial makeup of a workforce may be evidence of the absence of intentional discrimination).
92. E.g., Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and
the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & Econ. 451 (2006). As a matter of doctrine,
this is insufficient to defeat a disparate impact claim, see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440
(1982), but it is relevant to policy arguments over the use of screens.
93. For a recent report collecting divergent views (albeit with an editorial slant against
the EEOC’s guidance), see U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Assessing the Impact of Criminal Background Checks and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Conviction Records Policy (2013). See also Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the
Discrimination?: Disparate Impact and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks,
49 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 197 (2014) (providing a generally positive assessment).
94. Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Maurice Emsellem, Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, 65 Million “Need Not Apply”: The Case for Reforming Criminal Background
Checks for Employment 3 & 27 n.2 (2011), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/
2011/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf; see also Office of the Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, The Attorney General’s Report on Criminal History Background Checks
51 (2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf (estimating that 30% of the adult population has a state rap sheet).
95. Amy L. Solomon, In Search of a Job: Criminal Records as Barriers to Employment, 270
Nat’l Inst. Just. J. 42, 43 (2012), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238488.pdf.
96. Id. at 44; Crime in the United States 2012: Table 43, Fed. Bureau Investigation,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/43
tabledatadecoverviewpdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
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arrests are of men.97 The United States also has the highest incarceration rate
in the world, with approximately one in every 100 adults incarcerated at any
given time.98 Like arrest rates, incarceration rates vary dramatically by race
and by sex. Black men are imprisoned at about six times the rate of white
men, and Hispanic men at about three times the rate of white men.99
Women in general are far less likely than men to be imprisoned, and although women of color are more likely to be imprisoned than white women,
the racial divergence is less pronounced.100 Research suggests that, although
black men may commit certain crimes at higher rates than members of
other racial groups, the biases of police, judges, prosecutors, jurors, and defense counsel also significantly contribute to the different rates of arrests,
convictions, and incarcerations.101
The cumulative upshot of these disparities is stark: in 2001, nearly 17%
of adult black males had been incarcerated;102 by contrast, in that same year,
only 2.6% of adult white men had spent time in prison, and only 0.3% of
white women had.103 If current trends continue, one in every three black
male babies born today will spend time in jail.104 Professor Alexander has
provocatively argued that mass incarceration represents a new Jim Crow regime, in that it enforces a racial caste system, albeit using a “colorblind,”
race-neutral rhetoric.105 Whether or not one agrees with her claims or with
the imputation of racially discriminatory intent undergirding the system, it
is clear that the criminal-justice system reaches deep into society and that
97. See Crime in the United States 2012: Table 33, Fed. Bureau Investigation, http://
www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/33table
datadecoverviewpdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
98. Pew Ctr. on the States, One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008, at 3 (2008),
available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/sentencing_and_corrections/onein100pdf.pdf. Given significant budget shortfalls and
mounting criticism, incarceration rates have declined somewhat since 2008, but they remain
quite high. Erica Goode, U.S. Prison Populations Decline, Reflecting New Approach to Crime,
N.Y. Times, July 25, 2013, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/usprison-populations-decline-reflecting-new-approach-to-crime.html.
99. See E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, NCJ 239808, Prisoners in 2011, at 8 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.
100. See id.
101. The Sentencing Project, Report of The Sentencing Project to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee Regarding Racial Disparities in the United
States Criminal Justice System 3–16 (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/
publications/rd_ICCPR%20Race%20and%20Justice%20Shadow%20Report.pdf.
102. Thomas P. Bonczar, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, NCJ 197976, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974–2001, at 5 (2003).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 8. Although the Bonczar report is now more than ten years old, recent
publications continue to project that one in three African American males will go to prison.
See, e.g., Marc Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 91 Prison J. (Issue 3
Supp.) 87S, 88S (2011).
105. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness (rev. ed. 2012).
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black and Latino men disproportionately feel its effects.106 This reality profoundly impacts employment because employers now commonly use criminal background screens as an element in hiring.107 A recent survey found
that almost 90% of employers run background checks for at least some positions, with 69% screening all prospective employees.108 Additionally, many
employers ask applicants to disclose on application forms whether they have
been convicted of a crime.109
A patchwork of laws mitigates to some extent the exclusionary effects
that would otherwise result from the use of background screens. A number
of states and localities have enacted “ban-the-box” measures that preclude at
least public employers from asking about criminal records on application
forms; most of these statutes permit employers to make such inquiries only
after applicants have advanced to a later stage in the screening process.110
Some state laws explicitly limit the extent to which employers may make
decisions based on an applicant’s criminal record.111 The federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act and state analogues require employers to inform individuals
when they are taking an adverse action based on a background check.112
(This requirement may easily be violated,113 which is particularly troublesome because reports have found widespread inaccuracies in criminal background databases.114) Additionally, disparate impact has played a significant
106. For a critique of the analogy, see James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 21 (2012).
107. See, e.g., Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., SHRM Survey Findings: Background
Checking—The Use of Background Checks in Hiring Decisions 6 (2012), available at
http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Documents/2012BackgroundCheck_Criminal_FINAL.pptx (discussing reasons for the rapid increase in background
screening); Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination Law,
91 Wash. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 29–30), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract =2442629 (similar).
108. See Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., supra note 107, at 2.
109. See, e.g., Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, Statewide Ban the Box: Reducing Unfair
Barriers to Employment of People with Criminal Records (2014), available at http://
www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/ModelStateHiringInitiatives.pdf?nocdn=1; Judy Greenwald, Employers Still Ask Applicants about Criminal Convictions, Survey Shows, Crain’s Detroit Bus.
(Apr. 11, 2014, 7:01 AM), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20140411/NEWS/140419973/
employers-still-ask-applicants-about-criminal-convictions-survey# (reporting on a 2014 survey that found that 66% of employers asked candidates to disclose convictions on job
applications).
110. The National Employment Law Project tracks legislation on its website. Ban the Box:
A Fair Chance for a Stronger Economy, Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, http://www.nelp.org/page/
content/banthebox/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2014); see also Fishkin, supra note 107, at 30–31
(collecting and discussing state and local bans).
111. See Fishkin, supra note 107, at 31 n.115 (collecting laws).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) (2012).
113. See Fishkin, supra note 107, at 17 n.56 (discussing challenges of determining compliance with this provision).
114. See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance No.
915.002, Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 5 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc
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role in legal challenges to the practice of excluding applicants with criminal
records.115
The leading case addressing the disparate impact of criminal background screens dates from shortly after Griggs. In Green v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co., the plaintiff challenged the employer’s refusal to hire anyone
who had ever been convicted of a criminal offense other than a minor traffic
violation.116 In finding a prima facie case of disparate impact, the court relied on both local data regarding conviction rates and data from the railroad’s employment records showing that blacks were rejected under the
policy at a much higher rate than whites; the court then held that a categorical ban was not justified as a business necessity.117 It suggested that, for a
screening policy to pass muster, an employer would need to consider the
nature and gravity of the offense, the nature of the position sought, and the
time since the offense occurred.118 The EEOC later endorsed these factors in
guidance documents issued in 1987 and 1990 and in its compliance
manual.119
In recent years, as the prevalence of screens has increased, there have
been numerous class actions filed claiming that the indiscriminate use of
background screens causes an unlawful disparate impact.120 The issue gained
even more prominence in 2012, when the EEOC provided extensive guidance on the use of background screens121 and announced that litigating
cases of alleged abuse would be one of its strategic priorities.122 The guidance
.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm; see also Jeff Rossen & Avni Patel, Background Check
Firms Making Errors, Today (Nov. 9, 2012, 7:41 AM), http://www.today.com/id/49505767/ns/
today-today_news/t/rossen-reports-background-check-firms-making-errors/.
115. For a good review of cases, see Alexandra Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment
Discrimination Against Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14 Berkeley J. Afr.-Am. L. &
Pol’y 1 (2012).
116. 523 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1975).
117. Green, 523 F.2d at 1297.
118. Id.
119. See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Policy Statement on the
Issue of Conviction Records Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1987),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict1.html; U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance No. 915.061, Consideration of Arrest Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1990), available
at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/arrest_records.html; 2 U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, Compliance Manual app. § 604-A (1991).
120. See, e.g., Arroyo v. Accenture, No. 10-civ-3013 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 8, 2010); Johnson
v. Locke, No. 10-civ-03105 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 13, 2010); Mayer v. Driver Solutions, Inc., No.
10-cv-1939 (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 30, 2010); Hudson v. First Transit, No. 10-cv-03158 (N.D. Cal.
filed July 20, 2010). Some of these cases have since been favorably settled, e.g., Mayer v. Driver
Solutions, No. 10-cv-1939, 2012 WL 3578856 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2012), but as this Review went
to press, the case against the U.S. Census Bureau was still pending. See About the Census
Worker Class Action Case, Census Worker Class Action Website, http://www.censusdiscriminationlawsuit.com/index.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
121. See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, supra note 114.
122. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Strategic Enforcement Plan: FY
2013–2016 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm.
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reviews national statistics showing that black and Latino men are arrested
and convicted at much higher rates than white men, and it then concludes
that an employer’s use of background screens would generally establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact. Noting that arrests are not proof of
criminal conduct and that arrest records are often inaccurate, the EEOC
guidance suggests that employers generally should not rely on arrest records
in making employment decisions (although the conduct underlying an arrest may be relevant). Regarding convictions, the guidance suggests that employers should not adopt a blanket rule that prohibits the hiring of exoffenders; rather, the guidance advises employers to assess the relevance of a
prior conviction in light of at least all three of the Green factors and then
provide an opportunity for an “individualized assessment” for anyone who
might be excluded because of past criminal conduct.
The EEOC has also brought several high-profile suits on the issue. Some
of these cases are still pending, but the early results have not been favorable
to the EEOC. Although national statistics strongly suggest that criminal
background screens disproportionately impact black and Latino applicants,
the court in one early case granted summary judgment to the employer on
the ground that the EEOC had not developed sufficiently specific evidence
showing that this employer’s particular policies caused a disparate impact.123
Indeed, the court excoriated the EEOC’s expert testimony regarding the
screen’s alleged disparate impact, characterizing it as “rife with material errors” and “analytical fallacies,” such as failure to consider the full applicant
pool and to analyze the precise time frame alleged in the complaint.124 In
another early case, the EEOC failed to gather statistical evidence to rebut the
employer’s motion for summary judgment and eventually agreed to submit
a joint motion to dismiss, perhaps in part because the Commission had
learned during the course of the litigation that the defendant had actually
hired a significant number of ex-offenders.125
Although this litigation campaign is still in its early stages, these losses
suggest a few lessons. First, the EEOC—and private plaintiffs—will need to
investigate rigorously an employer’s specific policy to prove that it causes a
disparate impact. Although in Griggs the Supreme Court was willing to rely
on statewide statistics to infer that Duke Power’s requirements caused a disparate impact, Gilbert and Dothard show that, even in those early years,
courts were uncomfortable assuming a disparate impact if the challenged
conduct did not “feel” discriminatory (in the sense of being intentionally
discriminatory). Wards Cove emphasized the need to identify a particular

123. EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783, 798–99 (D. Md. 2013).
124. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 793–96. The methods of the same EEOC expert were
also harshly criticized in a case challenging the use of credit histories. EEOC v. Kaplan Higher
Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 2014).
125. EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-907, 2011 WL 1707281, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich.
Mar. 31, 2011) (discussing this history in the context of deciding the employer’s motion for
fees, costs, and sanctions).
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practice giving rise to a disparate impact; this aspect of the decision was not
explicitly overridden, and courts continue to rely on it in denying claims.126
Second, and relatedly, many of the national statistics that the EEOC uses
in its guidance point to intersectional claims; that is, they report the statistical imbalance with respect to African American and Hispanic men as compared to white men.127 And in at least one of its recent cases, the EEOC
alleged a disparate impact on the basis of both sex and race.128 Because the
court in that case found the statistics generally unreliable, it never addressed
what kind of statistical showing would be required to prove an intersectional
claim or whether the court would simply assess the issues raised as implicating separate claims on the basis of sex and race. The distinction might be
important. As noted above, although women of color are arrested and convicted at higher rates than white women, the disparities are not nearly as
significant as they are for men.129 Thus, evaluating an employer’s policy for
disparate impact on the basis of race alone would “dilute” the disparate impact experienced by black and Latino men.
To see this, consider the following (stylized) example. Imagine an employer hiring for new positions. Twenty-five black men apply; twenty-five
white men apply; twenty-five black women apply; and twenty-five white
women apply. If the employer excludes from consideration anyone who has
ever been incarcerated, statistical averages suggest that six of the black men
would be excluded, leaving nineteen eligible for consideration; one of the
white men would be excluded, leaving twenty-four eligible for consideration;
one of the black women would be excluded, again leaving twenty-four eligible for consideration; and none of the white women would be excluded.130 If
the policy is evaluated simply on the basis of race, the passage rates of men
and women must be assessed together: 86% of the black applicants can be
considered for the job, and 98% of the white applicants can be considered
for the job. This is a real disparity, to be sure, but it falls well short of the
EEOC’s rule of thumb for establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact.131 The same disparity results if the policy is considered on the basis of
sex alone. But if one considers the passage rates in an intersectional manner—assessing the policy’s effects on black men specifically—the resulting
disparities are much greater. Only 76% of the black men could be considered, a rate that is far lower than that of any of the other potential groups of
comparison (96% of the white men; 96% of the black women; and 100% of
126. See, e.g., Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 799 (quoting Wards Cove for the proposition
that the plaintiff must offer evidence “isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
127. See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, supra note 114, at 9–10.
128. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 789.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 99–100.
130. These projections are based on the national incarceration rates for working-age individuals reported in Bonczar, supra note 102.
131. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(d) (2014) (describing the “four-fifths” rule).
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the white women). Although courts and theorists might disagree as to which
comparison is most appropriate, the resulting disparity from any of these
comparisons meets the EEOC’s threshold test.
Of course, in the real world, applicant pools are not perfectly balanced
in terms of race or sex (or age, which is also a key factor in arrest and
conviction rates), and the interplay of these statistical averages might vary.
Nonetheless, this analysis suggests that an intersectional approach would
generally prove advantageous for plaintiffs. That said, even though, as discussed in Part II, the potential salience of an intersectional approach to disparate impact analysis has long been recognized, it has been very little
discussed in theory or tested in litigation. A full exploration of the subject is
beyond the scope of this Review. My objective is simply to suggest that current litigation over criminal records offers a potentially fertile testing
ground. For an intersectional approach to take root, however, it will need to
be carefully and thoughtfully developed.
Third, even if the EEOC or a private plaintiff can make it past these
threshold questions, it may be challenging for a plaintiff to establish that
background checks are not job related and a business necessity, or that there
is a less discriminatory mechanism for satisfying an employer’s legitimate
concerns regarding safety. Although in recent decades courts have been quite
deferential to employers’ claimed justifications, the early history Belton recounts is instructive in reminding us that the standard once did have real
teeth and that Congress ratified the language through a hard-fought legislative victory. Selmi posits that, in the absence of political pressure or blameworthy conduct, courts are unwilling to require employers to change their
standard business practices.132 In this context, the larger political discussion
around ban-the-box legislation may interact in productive ways with formal
disparate impact doctrine. Even though, as Professor Fishkin has shown, the
advocacy for these new laws is largely framed in colorblind language, there is
a growing movement challenging the indiscriminate use of background
checks.133 There is also strong evidence that recidivism rates decline quickly
in the years after an offense and that they vary by offense and by the age of
the perpetrator.134 These studies provide support for the “individualized assessment” that the EEOC advocates. They suggest that it should be hard to
establish that a categorical ban on hiring ex-offenders—let alone a categorical ban on hiring individuals who have merely been arrested—is a business
132. See Selmi, supra note 12, at 763–66, 773–76.
133. See Fishkin, supra note 107, at 27–36, 55–56.
134. See, e.g., U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, supra note 93, at 23–24 (testimony by Dr.
Blumstein stating that “most recidivism occurs within the first three years after a previous
event” and that the “risk pattern of those who were convicted compared to those who were
merely arrested was not very much different”); Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 Criminology 327
(2009) (finding that risk of reoffense after an arrest falls off quickly within a relatively narrow
time frame); Megan Kurlychek et al., Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does An Old Criminal
Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 483 (2006) (finding risk substantially similar to that of nonoffenders six to seven years after an arrest).
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necessity, since more tailored tests would likely be sufficient to address an
employer’s legitimate concerns that a prospective employee would be particularly likely to engage in misconduct.
Despite these possibilities for the doctrine’s productive development, it
would be easy to look at the EEOC’s win–loss record in court (at this point
at least) and conclude that its effort to use disparate impact to address criminal background screens has been a failure. But published court decisions do
not fairly capture the full effect of the new guidance or the disparate impact
doctrine that underlies it. First, it is important to note that the EEOC entered into significant conciliation agreements with large employers such as
Pepsi135 and J.B. Hunt,136 agreements in which the companies consented to
revise their background screening policies. Private settlements have likewise
required policy changes. More generally, equal employment opportunity is
now achieved not only through litigation but also through compliance work.
In this respect, the EEOC’s new guidance and aggressive stance have spurred
significant change. A quick search on the internet reveals numerous memoranda and webinars from law firms advising their clients to review and refine their criminal background check policies and counseling clients to
eschew screens that make determinations based on arrests.137 Clients seem to
be listening. In a 2014 survey, 88% of businesses said that they had
“adopted” the EEOC’s guidance, compared with 32% in a survey a year
earlier.138
135. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Pepsi to Pay $3.13 Million
and Made Major Policy Changes to Resolve EEOC Finding of Nationwide Hiring Discrimination Against African Americans (Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/news
room/release/1-11-12a.cfm.
136. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, J.B. Hunt Agrees to Settle
EEOC Race Discrimination Case Regarding Criminal Conviction Records (June 28, 2012),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/6-28-13c.cfm.
137. See, e.g., D. Albert Brannen, Criminal Background Checks: EEOC Position Presents a
Legal Quandary, Fisher & Phillips LLP (May 28, 2013), http://www.laborlawyers.com/crimi
nal-background-checks-eeoc-position-presents-a-legal-quandary (discussing the EEOC’s new
guidance and the need to evaluate background check practices for compliance); Background
Checks, Ogletree Deakins, http://www.ogletreedeakins.com/training-and-compliance/compliance/background-checks (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) (same); EEOC Broadens and Clarifies
Scope of Title VII Enforcement, Morgan Lewis (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.morganlewis.com/
pubs/LEPG_LF_EEOCScopeofTitleVIIEnforcement_27april12 (same); The New EEOC Guidance on the Use of Arrest and Conviction Records in Making Employment Decisions, Jackson
Lewis (May 15, 2012), http://www.jacksonlewis.com/media/pnc/6/media.2016.wmv (same). A
leading organization for human-resources professionals also did training on the new guidance.
See Susan R. Heylman, Using Credit and Criminal Background Checks, Soc’y for Human Resources Mgmt. (May 16, 2013), http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/pages/
credit-criminal-background-checks.aspx.
138. Nick Fishman, Are Employers Adapting to EEOC Guidance on Employment Background Checks?, EmployeeScreenIQ (May 27, 2014), http://www.employeescreen.com/iqblog/
employers-adapting-to-eeoc-employment-background-checks. The report does not specify
what it means to have “adopted” the guidance; only 63% of the companies surveyed indicated
that they performed an individualized assessment of the significance of any applicant convictions identified through background screening, even though that procedure is clearly recommended by the EEOC guidance.
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Disparate impact is a clunky (and some argue illegitimate139) vehicle to
address the indiscriminate use of background checks. The underlying problem is the unfair exclusion of individuals—of all races—with criminal
records. But as Fishkin points out, disparate impact frequently works to
loosen “bottlenecks” that unreasonably limit opportunity for whites as well
as for racial minorities.140 (Also, research suggests that employers are considerably less likely to hire a black or Latino applicant with a criminal record
than a white applicant who has been convicted of a comparable offense.141
Such practices theoretically could be challenged as disparate treatment, but
it would often be difficult for an applicant to provide proof that race played
a role in the decision.) And while it might be preferable to combat the problem through legislation directly addressing the issue, political realities make
that a slow and difficult process. Currently, only six states have legislation
substantively regulating how private employers assess past criminal convictions;142 two of these states, along with three additional states, have enacted
ban-the-box laws that prohibit private employers from asking about arrests
or convictions early in the application process.143 Title VII, by contrast, applies in all states and reaches almost all employers. Its protections are also far
more robust than the protections in many of these state laws, and violating
the statute can give rise to liability for back pay, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees.144
The threat of disparate impact liability, combined with the EEOC’s determination to enforce Title VII in this context, has engendered a national
conversation about the use—and misuse—of criminal background screens.
In Title VII’s earliest years, as Belton amply demonstrates, federal judges
were often on the vanguard of efforts to expand employment opportunity.
Not so today. The contemporary federal judiciary is more conservative, and
courts appear (so far at least) to be hostile to disparate impact claims in this
context. But despite some early litigation losses, the combination of strong
agency guidance, management-side compliance work, and strategic public
and private litigation efforts, as well as the growth of ban-the-box legislation, is collectively changing workplace practices. Of course, if the agency
and private plaintiffs continue to lose in court, the compliance effects will be
diminished. At this point, however, despite its limitations, disparate impact
continues to play a significant role in modern employment discrimination
139. See, e.g., Letter from the Attorneys General of Nine States to EEOC Commissioners
(July 24, 2013), available at https://doj.mt.gov/wp-content/uploads/EEOC-Letter-Final.pdf
(last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
140. See generally Fishkin, supra note 107, at 58–75.
141. See, e.g., Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 Am. J. Soc. 937, 958
(2003); Devah Pager et al., Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment, 74
Am. Soc. Rev. 777, 785–86 (2009).
142. See Fishkin, supra note 107, at 31 n.115.
143. See Nat’l Emp’t Law Project, supra note 109.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)–(k) (2012).
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doctrine, working, in the language of Griggs, to achieve “equality of employment opportunities” by removing “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment.”145

145. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429, 431 (1971).
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